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Abstract
In this paper, we establish a connection between ranking theory and
general equilibrium theory. First of all, we show that the ranking vector
of PageRank or Invariant method is precisely the equilibrium of a special
Cobb-Douglas market. This gives a natural economic interpretation for
the PageRank or Invariant method. Furthermore, we propose a new rank-
ing method, the CES ranking, which is minimally fair, strictly monotone
and invariant to reference intensity, but not uniform or weakly additive.
1 Introduction
Ranking, which aggregates the preferences of individual agents over a set of
alternatives, is not only a fundamental problem in social choice theory but
also has many applications in real life. For instance, the well-known PageRank
algorithm [7] is designed to rank Web pages while the Invariant Method [3, 5] is
proposed to evaluate the intellectual influence of academic journals and papers.
Intuitively, the PageRank and the Invariant method share a common prop-
erty in that the more “vote” an agent gets, the higher ranking he has. Although
they work very well in practice, the economic interpretations of their effective-
ness are not obvious. Slutzki and Volji [3], as well as Palacios-Huerta and Volji
[5], gave the first set of axioms that characterize the Invariant method. Later,
Altman and Tennenholtz [6] gave a set of combinatorial axioms to characterize
the PageRank algorithm, while Brandt and Fischer [4] interpreted PageRank as
a solution of a weak tournament.
General equilibrium theory [9] is one of the most prominent theories in math-
ematical economics. It studies how a market system, known as the “invisible
hand”, makes the demands of a market’s participants equal to its supplies. Ar-
row and Debreu [10] showed that under mild conditions, a market always has
an equilibrium. The result of this research became known as the Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium.
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In this paper, we will establish a connection between ranking methods and
the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Naturally, the preference of one agent for an-
other, which is usually represented as a directed edge in a graph, can be viewed
as the demand between agents. Intuitively, the more demands a good gets, the
higher price it should have. Therefore, an equilibrium price could be a good
candidate for a ranking vector. On the other hand, the PageRank and the In-
variant method are the stationary distributions of ergordic Markov chains. Both
the existence of a PageRank or an Invariant ranking vector and the existence of
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium can be shown via the Brouwer’s fixed point theories
[10, 9]. We will interpret one form of a fixed point as the other. More specif-
ically, we will show that the ranking vector of the PageRank or the Invariant
method is indeed the equilibrium of a special Cobb-Douglas market. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first connection between ranking methods and
the general equilibrium theory. Based on our observations, we propose a new
ranking method, the CES ranking, which is minimally fair, strictly monotone,
and invariant to reference intensity, but not uniform or weakly additive.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Ranking Problem
In this subsection, we will follow [6] to define ranking problems. Let A be a finite
set, representing the set of agents, andM be a |A|×|A| matrix, representing the
preference relationships among the agents. A ranking problem is represented as
〈A,M〉. For any n ∈ N, let ∆n = {(x1, ..., xn)|∀i, xi ≥ 0 and
∑
i xi = 1}.
Definition 1 A ranking function maps a ranking problem 〈A,M〉 to a vector
pi ∈ ∆|A|.
2.2 Markov chain and PageRank
Markov chain [8] A discreteMarkov chain is a random process {Xi} on a state
space S = {s1, ..., sn} that satisfies the Markov property:
P (Xj |Xi, ..., X0) = P (Xj |Xi) = pij ,
where pij is the transition property from state si to sj and ∀i,
∑
j pij = 1. Let
P be the transition matrix. Correspondingly, we can define
Definition 2 (State Transition Graph:) Given a discrete Markov chain {Xi},
the corresponding state transition graph is G = (V,E,W ) where V = S and
(si, sj) ∈ E iff pij > 0, and wsi,sj = pij.
It is well known that if the state transition graph is strongly connected and
aperiodic, the corresponding Markov chain is called ergordic and has a unique
stationary distribution pi such that
pi = PTpi
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PageRank [7] Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with vertex set V and edge
set E. We assume that there is no self-loop in G. Let N = |V |, and for a
vertex i ∈ V , denote by out(i) the out-degree of i. The transition matrix of G
is T = [Tij ]1≤i,j≤N :
Tij =
{
1
out(i) if (i, j) ∈ E
0, otherwise
Denote by e ∈ RN the all 1 row vector (1, 1, · · · , 1), and by E ∈ RN×N the all
1 matrix. Let T¯ be identical to T except that if a row in P is all 0, it should
be replaced by e/N . A page without outgoing links is called a dangling page.
For some constant c, 0 < c < 1, the transition matrix for the PageRank Markov
chain is
P = cT¯ + (1− c)E/N.
The PageRank pi is the stationary distribution, i.e.,piP = pi, of the above Markov
chain P .
Invariant Method [3] In the definition of PageRank [7], if the transition matrix
T is irreducible (the corresponding graph is strongly connected), its unique
stationary distribution is the ranking vector. Thus, the PageRank and the
Invariant method are essentially equivalent in mathematics.
2.3 Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of exchange markets
In an exchange market, there are m traders and n divisible goods. Let T =
{T1, .., Tm} be the set of traders and G = {G1, ..., Gn} be the set of goods. Each
trader i has an initial endowment of wi,j ≥ 0 of good j and a utility function
ui : R
n
+ → R. The individual goal of trader Ti is to obtain a new bundle of
goods that maximizes his utility. Let xi ∈ R
n
+ be the bundle of goods of Ti
after the exchange, where xi,j is the amount of good j. Naturally, the demand
cannot exceed the supply:
∑
i xi,j ≤
∑
i wi,j , for every good j.
We use p ∈ ∆n to denote a price vector, where pj is the price of Gj . For
any trader Ti, given p, we let x
∗
i (p) denote the bundle of goods that maximize
his utility under the budget constraint:
x∗i (p) = argmax x∈Rn
+
, x·p≤wi·p ui(x).
Definition 3 (Arrow-Debreu equilibrium) A market equilibrium is a price
vector p ∈ ∆n such that the market clears:
For every good Gj ∈ G,
∑
i∈[m] x
∗
i,j(p) ≤
∑
i∈[m] wi,j ; If pj > 0, then∑
i∈[m] x
∗
i,j(p) =
∑
i∈[m] wi,j .
2.4 CES Utility Functions
CES utility functions: [2, 9] The CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution)
function over a bundle of goods (xi1, ..., xin) is the family of utility functions
ui(xi1, ..., xin) = (
∑n
j=1 αijx
ρi
ij )
1/ρi , where −∞ < ρi < 1, ρi 6= 0 and αij ≥ 0.
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The parameter 1/(1−ρi) is called the elasticity of substitution. The CES utility
function has a very nice property: its demand functions have explicit forms.
That is, given a strictly positive price vector pi ∈ Rn++, the demand xij is
xij =
α
1/(1−ρi)
ij
pi
1/(1−ρi)
j
×
∑
k pikwik∑
k α
1/(1−ρi)
ik pi
−ρi/(1−ρi)
k
There are three important utility functions within the CES category.
1. ρi → 1 corresponds to linear utility functions, where ui(xi1, ..., xin) =∑
j αijxij . In this case, the set of goods that the agent wants are perfect
substitutes for each other.
2. ρi → −∞ corresponds to Leontief utility functions. The Leontief utility
function, in general, has the form of ui(xi1, ..., xin) = min
j:βij>0
xij
βij
, where
βij ≥ 0. In this case, the set of goods that the agent wants are perfect
complement of each other.
3. ρi → 0 corresponds to Cobb-Douglas utility functions. The Cobb-Douglas
utility function, in general, has the form of ui(xi1, ..., xin) =
∏
j x
βij
ij ,
where βij ≥ 0. This demand function is a perfect balance of substitution
and complementarity effects [2].
3 PageRank/Invariant Method V.S. a Cobb-Douglas
Market
In this section, we will establish a connection between PageRank/Invariant
Method and Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. We do this by showing a more gen-
eral theorem about Markov chains.
Theorem 1 Given an ergordic Markov chain, there is a mapping from the
Markov chain to a Cobb-Douglas market, such that the stationary distribution of
the Markov chain is precisely the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the Cobb-Douglas
market.
Proof. The general idea of the proof is to reduce the state transition graph
of an ergordic Markov chain to the economy graph of a Cobb-Douglas market.
Given the state transition graph G = (V,E,W ) and the transition matrix P , we
can construct a Cobb-Douglas economy graph as follows: for i ∈ [1..n], there is
a trader Ti corresponding to each state si, and there is a directed link from Ti to
Tj iff (si, sj) ∈ E; for trader Ti, let N(Ti) be the set of outgoing neighbors of Ti.
The utility function of Ti is ui(xi) =
∏
j∈N(Ti)
x
pij
ij , where pij is the transition
probability. Initially Ti has one unit of the good Gi but no other goods. We
call such a Cobb-Douglas economy M . We claim that the market equilibrium
of M is also the stationary distribution of P .
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First of all, since G is strongly connected and the Cobb-Douglas utility
function belongs to the CES utility function class, according to Theorem 1 of
Codenotti et al. [2] M has a strictly positive equilibrium. By the demand
function of CES utility function, when ρi → 0,
xij =
pijpii
pij
.
By the definition of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, for every good with strictly
positive price, its demand must be equal to its supply. Thus,∑
i
xij =
∑
i
pijpii
pij
= 1.
Equivalently, ∑
i
pijpii = pij .
Thus, pi is the stationary distribution of the Markov chain P .
Actually, by the above reduction, we also implicitly show that M has a unique
equilibrium. Most importantly, since the PageRank or Invariant method is
a special Markov chain, the ranking vector of the PageRank or the Invariant
method can also be interpreted as the equilibrium of a Cobb-Douglas market.
Remarks: Eaves [15] showed that the computation of an equilibrium for a
Cobb-Douglas market can be reduced to solving a linear equation system. Al-
though it was not explicitly claimed in [15], Eaves’s result implies that an equilib-
rium of a Cobb-Douglas market actually corresponds to a principle eigenvector
of a stochastic matrix. In Theorem 1, we show the reverse direction of Eaves’
reduction. That is a principle eigenvector of a stochastic matrix corresponds to
an equilibrium of a special Cobb-Douglas market. Thus, our result, which is
essentially different from Eaves’ in terms of motivations, is a complement of the
result in [15].
Economic Interpretations: It is believed that the validity of PageRank comes
from the fact that the Markov chain is a good model for the Web surfing behavior
of Web users. In web graph, a link from page p to page q means that a Web user
at page p may find the content of page q is useful. Thus, a link in web graph
means a vote or reference. Intuitively, the more votes a page gets, the more
important it is. Indeed, for a Web user, his goal is to maximize his information
needs by following outgoing links of a page to visit other pages. Thus, in our
Cobb-Douglas economy graph, each Web page is corresponding to an agent, the
content of the page is corresponding to the good the agent initially owns, and a
link from p to q means that the agent on page p has a demand for the content
of page q. Intuitively, the more “demand” a page gets, the more important it
is.
Theorem 1 provides a new perspective to view PageRank. That is the sub-
stitution and complementarity effects of outgoing links. For instance, suppose
5
we have a directory page of a university, which has outgoing links pointing to
the home pages of each of the unversity’s the departments. If a Web user clicks
one of the outgoing links, it is unlikely that he will click any other. Thus, for
this page, its outgoing links are more likely to be substitutes for each other
than complements. On the other hand, suppose we have a news page, which
has outgoing links pointing to related news pages. A Web user who clicks one of
the outgoing links is likely to click another one. Thus, for this page, its outgoing
links are more likely to be complements for each other than substitutes. By The-
orem 1 and the properties of the Cobb-Douglas utility function, the set of pages
that a Web page points to is a mix of the substitution and complementarity
effects with elasticity of substitution 1 in PageRank.
4 Ranking via Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium
The Cobb-Douglas utility function corresponds to the CES utility function with
ρ→ 0. Thus, by choosing CES utility functions with different elasticities, we can
naturally extend the idea of PageRank to a new spectrum of ranking algorithms.
We propose the ranking method, which is called CES ranking, below.
Algorithm 1 CES ranking
1. Given the agents set A, choose a CES utility function ui for each agent i ∈ A
and set the initial endowment wi of it as ∀j 6= i, wij = 0 but wii = 1. The new
ranking problem is 〈A, {αij}i∈A,j∈A, {ρi}i∈A, {wi|i ∈ A}〉. W.L.O.G., for any i,
let
∑
j αij = 1.
2. If for agent i, αij = 0 for all j, set αij = 1/|A| for each j. Hence, ui =
(
∑n
j=1(1/|A|)x
ρi
ij )
1/ρi .
3. For each agent i, update αij to be αij ∗β+(1/|A|)∗ (1−β) for every j, where
β = 0.85. Correspondingly, the updated utility function is ui = (
∑n
j=1(αij ∗
β + (1/|A|) ∗ (1− β))xρiij )
1/ρi
4. Construct the economy graph G with respect to the CES economy defined
above. It is easy to see that G is strongly connected.
5. Compute an equilibrium of G and use it as the ranking vector.
Note that the new CES ranking problem 〈A, {αij}i∈A,j∈A, {ρi}i∈A, {wi|i ∈
A}〉 is a generalization of the ranking problem 〈A,M〉 defined in the Prelim-
inaries. Now we discuss the existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the CES
ranking, as well as some other properties related to ranking.
Existence of a ranking vector: By Theorem 1 in [2], as long as the economy
graph G is strongly connected, there is always a strictly positive equilibrium.
By the definition of the CES ranking, it is obvious that the economy graph of
it is strongly connected. Thus, a ranking vector always exists.
Uniqueness: According to [2], for CES utility functions with −1 ≤ ρ < 1, the
set of equilibria is convex. We further show that:
Claim 2 The CES ranking has a unique ranking vector if ∀i, ρi ≥ 0.
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In order to prove this claim, we first introduce the definition of gross substitute
(GS).
Definition 4 [9] For any j, let zj =
∑
i xij −
∑
iwij be the excess demand
function for Gj. The function z(.) has the gross substitute property if whenever
pi
′
and pi are such that, for some l, pi
′
l > pil and pi
′
j = pij for j 6= l, we have
zj(pi
′
) > zj(pi) for j 6= l.
If in the above definition the inequalities are weak, the property is referred to
as weak gross substitute (WGS). It is well known that:
Theorem 3 [9] If the aggregate excess demand function of an exchange econ-
omy has the GS property, the economy has at most one equilibrium.
Now we can prove the above claim.
Proof. 1 In the CES ranking, by the Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 in [2], as long
as the economy graph G is strongly connected, an equilibrium exists and every
equilibrium is strictly positive. Suppose we have two equilibria pi
′
and pi such
that for l, pi
′
l > pil and pi
′
h = pih for h 6= l. Note that ∀i, j, αij > 0. Thus, for
any j 6= l,
∑
i
xij =
∑
i
α
1/(1−ρi)
ij
pi
1/(1−ρi)
j
×
pii∑
k α
1/(1−ρi)
ik pi
−ρi/(1−ρi)
k
=
∑
i
α
1/(1−ρi)
ij ×
pii/pij∑
k α
1/(1−ρi)
ik (pik/pij)
−ρi/(1−ρi)
<
α
1/(1−ρl)
lj × pi
′
l/pi
′
j∑
k α
1/(1−ρl)
lk (pi
′
k/pi
′
j)
−ρl/(1−ρl)
+
∑
i6=l
α
1/(1−ρi)
ij × pi
′
i/pi
′
j∑
k α
1/(1−ρi)
ik (pi
′
k/pi
′
j)
−ρi/(1−ρi)
=
∑
i
x
′
ij
Thus, in the CES ranking, the excess demand function has the GS property.
Therefore, its equilibrium and the ranking vector are unique.
However, when ρ < −1, there may be multiple equilibria sets. Actually,
for ranking problems, we do not have to insist on the uniqueness of ranking
vectors. That is because in most cases, there are different ranking criteria for
one ranking problem. It is not surprising that different criteria induce different
rankings.
Efficiency of Computation: When −1 ≤ ρ < 1, an equilibrium of a CES
market can be computed via convex programming [2]. Thus, it is in polynomial
time. However, for some special utility functions (such as the Leontief utilty
function), it is PPAD-hard [12] to compute an equilibrium of it. However, for
1It is well known [2] that the CES utility functions satisfy WGS when ρ ≥ 0. However,
WGS does not imply the uniqueness of equilibrium.
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ranking problems that have relatively small sizes or do not require the real time
computation of ranking vectors, the efficiency may not be a serious concern.
In the next section, we study five natural properties, which are satisfied
by the PageRank and the Invariant method, with respect to the CES ranking.
First, we extend the concept of minimally fair [1] to the CES ranking.
Definition 5 A ranking system is minimally fair if when for any i, j, αij = 0,
the ranking score of agent i equals that of j for agent i, j ∈ A.
Claim 4 The CES ranking is minimally fair.
Proof. Since initially αij = 0 for any i, j, in order to make the economy
graph strongly connected, we set the utility function for each agent as ui =
((
∑
j
1
nx
ρ
ij)
1/ρ. With this setup, by the market clearing condition, we get
∑
i
(1/n)1/(1−ρ)
pi
1/(1−ρ)
j
×
pii∑
k(1/n)
1/(1−ρ)pi
−ρ/(1−ρ)
k
= 1
Thus, ∀j,
pij = (1/(
∑
k
pi
−ρ/(1−ρ)
k ))
1−ρ.
Note that the right-hand size of the above equation is independent of j. Thus,
pi = (1/n, ..., 1/n) is the only equilibrium for the market. Therefore, the CES
ranking is minimally fair.
Next, we extend the strictly monotone definition in [1] to the CES ranking.
Definition 6 A ranking system is strictly monotone iff for any two agents i and
j, if for any other agent p, αpi ≤ αpj and there exists h such that αhi < αhj,
the ranking score of agent i is strictly less than that of j.
Claim 5 The CES ranking is strictly monotone when the utility functions of
all the agents have the same elasticity of substitution.
Proof. By the market clearing condition, for any two agents i and j,
pi
1/(1−ρ)
i =
∑
p
α
1/(1−ρ)
pi × pip∑
k α
1/(1−ρ)
pk pi
−ρ/(1−ρ)
k
<
∑
p
α
1/(1−ρ)
pj × pip∑
k α
1/(1−ρ)
pk pi
−ρ/(1−ρ)
k
= pi
1/(1−ρ)
j
Thus, pii < pij .
Actually, the property of strictly monotone corresponds to the intuition that
the more demands a good gets, the higher price it is.
Slutzki and Volij showed [3] that,
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Theorem 6 [3] If a ranking system satisfies uniform, weakly additive and in-
variant to reference intensity, the ranking system must be the Invariant method.
In the next section, we will study the relationship between the CES ranking
and the three properties above.
Definition 7 [3] A ranking problem is regular if ∀i, j,
∑
k αik =
∑
k αjk while
∀i, j,
∑
k αki =
∑
k αkj. A ranking function is uniform if for every regular
ranking problem, the ranking score of each agent is 1N where N is the number
of agents.
Claim 7 The CES ranking is not uniform.
Proof. Suppose a system has three agents while the parameters of the agents
are ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ3 =
1
2 and α11 =
1
3 , α12 =
1
3 , α13 =
1
3 , α21 =
5
12 , α22 =
1
6 ,
α23 =
5
12 , α31 =
1
4 , α32 =
1
2 , α33 =
1
4 . By the market clearing condition,
pi21 =
1
3
2
× pi1
1
3
2
pi−11 +
1
3
2
pi−12 +
1
3
2
pi−13
+
5
12
2
× pi2
5
12
2
pi−11 +
1
6
2
pi−12 +
5
12
2
pi−13
+
1
4
2
× pi3
1
4
2
pi−11 +
1
2
2
pi−12 +
1
4
2
pi−13
It is easy to check that pi = (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) cannot satisfy the above equation. Thus,
the CES ranking is not uniform.
Actually, the uniform property requires that the ranking score of an agent is
linearly proportional to the number of “votes” it gets. This assumption may not
be reasonable universally. For instance, in the citation analysis, suppose both
paper A and B have m citations. In an extreme case, the citations of paper
A may only come from one research group while the citations of B come from
different research groups. Intuitively, paper B should be more important than
paper A. However, any ranking algorithm with the uniform property cannot
distinguish those two cases. The CES ranking, as a nonlinear ranking method,
may have the potential to find out new signals that were missed by the uniform
ranking methods.
The weakly additive [3] property says that for a regular ranking problem,
the ranking score is still linearly proportional to the “votes” after a symmetric
perturbation. Since the CES ranking is not uniform, it cannot satisfy the weakly
additive property, either.
Definition 8 [3] A ranking system is invariant to reference intensity if for any
agent i, when we multiply αij by a positive constant λ for every j, it cannot
change the ranking score of any agent.
Claim 8 The CES ranking is invariant to reference intensity.
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Proof. Note that
xij =
α
1/(1−ρi)
ij
pi
1/(1−ρi)
j
×
∑
k pikwik∑
k α
1/(1−ρi)
ik pi
−ρi/(1−ρi)
k
=
(λαij)
1/(1−ρi)
pi
1/(1−ρi)
j
×
∑
k pikwik∑
k(λαik)
1/(1−ρi)pi
−ρi/(1−ρi)
k
=
α
1/(1−ρi)
ij
pi
1/(1−ρi)
j
×
∑
k pikwik∑
k α
1/(1−ρi)
ik pi
−ρi/(1−ρi)
k
Thus, multiplying αij by a positive constant λ for every j cannot change the
demand function. Therefore, the set of equilibria remains the same.
When we summarize the above claims together, we get
Theorem 9 The CES ranking is minimally fair, strictly monotone and invari-
ant to reference intensity, but not uniform or weakly additive.
5 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we have established a connection between the ranking theory and
the general equilibrium theory. First, we showed that the ranking vector of
PageRank or Invariant method is actually the equilibrium of a special Cobb-
Douglas market. This gives a natural economic interpretation for the PageR-
ank and Invariant method. Furthermore, we propose a new ranking method,
the CES ranking, which is minimally fair, strictly monotone, and invariant to
reference intensity, but not uniform or weakly additive. The new CES ranking,
compared to PageRank and the Invariant method, is nonlinear, and could be
potentially used to find signals in a system missed by those existing ranking
methods.
With the observations in this paper, we have a complete picture of the
encoding power of the three limiting cases of CES utility functions. Pennock
and Wellman [13] showed that economies with almost the linear utility functions
can encode Bayesian networks. Codenotti et al. [12] proved that economies with
the Leontief utility functions can encode bimatrix games. Now we demonstrate
that economies with the Cobb-Douglas utility functions can encode Markov
chains.
We believe that this paper points to a few promising directions that are
worth further exploration.
• Explore more properties that the CES ranking satisfies and make justifi-
cations for the properties it does not satisfy.
• For various applications, what is the “right” utility function for each
agent? We may go beyond the CES utility functions and explore other
ones, such as WGS utility functions [2].
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• Design efficient algorithms to compute ranking vectors.
• Further investigate the uniqueness of ranking vectors. If there are multiple
equilibria points, do they induce the same ranking? If not, interpret their
different economic meanings in the context of ranking.
• Last but not least, design an effective evaluation system for ranking meth-
ods and find an application where the CES ranking can outperform exist-
ing ranking methods.
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